U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met on Monday in the latest round of nuclear talks. Iran and Western governments have been working on negotiations with the goal of reducing the size of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting sanctions imposed on the country.
Solving the Iranian nuclear issue and improving relations with the West were a key parts of President Hassan Rouhani’s platform back in 2013, and shortly after taking office he took the first step by reaching an agreement with the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany – to start rolling back Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for reduced sanctions.
“[Rouhani’s] goal is to change this into better relations with the world,” says Mohammad Tabaar, assistant professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Services at Texas A&M University. Tabaar has focused much of his research on Iran’s domestic and foreign policy.
Tabaar says pro-Americanism is currently “the major issue to use to gain domestic legitimacy” in Iran.
“One of the things that happened after President Rouhani became president was he, for the first time ever, spoke with an American president, with President Obama,” Tabaar said. “And that has made President Rouhani very popular.”
Using external issues to achieve domestic political gain has been a strategy of Iranian politics since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
“Based on these regional issues, based on these external issues, [various] domestic institutions will be empowered or will be undermined,” Tabaarsaaid.
On the other side of the negotiations, the West hopes to use nuclear talks to empower moderates in Iran. However, this strategy has the potential to backfire.
“The moment you decide to empower the moderates in Iran, you make the other side nervous. And what the conservatives will do is, automatically and quickly, they try to derail any rapprochement or any negotiations or anything that would benefit the moderates,” Tabaar said. “Every time, the Western governments say, ‘So-and -o is a moderate president or a moderate group we should work with’, this is the kiss of death, and it undermines them.”
Successful nuclear negotiations would be a win for the moderates and could help secure some seats in the upcoming 2016 elections of the Iranian Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, which chooses the Supreme Leader of Iran, says Tabaar.
“[President Rouhani] would like to use this nuclear issue to win elections next time and bring more pragmatists into these important critical bodies, and eventually undermine the conservatives. Whether or not he’s going to succeed, it remains to be seen,” Tabaar said.
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INTERVIEW HIGHLIGHTS
On Using External Issues To Consolidate Power In Post-Revolution Iran
In my research on Iran since the ’79 Revolution, I noticed that various political actors and factions and institutions in Iran often manipulate external issues for domestic gain. And it goes back, as I said, all the way to the ’78, ’79 Islamic Revolution. And I'll give you one example. We often hear the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran, which ended Iran-U.S. relations, we often hear that that happened because of the 1953 coup. So it was a reaction that the Iranian Islamist students had towards that 53 coup, as I said, the CIA-led coup in Iran. But the truth is that the Islamists at the time were afraid of the nationalist and the leftist groups. And in order to marginalize these, both of their rivals, what they did was they decided to do the ultimate act – and that was to occupy the U.S. Embassy to capitalize on massive anti-American sentiment in Iran. Example number two: the Iran-Iraq War. There's no question that Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. However, the clerical establishment in Iran at the time implicitly welcomed the war because they hadn't consolidated themselves yet. Partly through the hostage crisis they could consolidate certain aspects of the regime, but not completely. So they used the Iran-Iraq War to make sure that the Iranian Army, and also the remnants of the nationalist and leftist groups, were subdued or completely eradicated so that they could not pose a threat.
On Competing Political Factions In Iran
There is a competition right now between two political factions in the country. One is led by the Supreme Leader and the IRGC and other appointed institutions. And the second one is the president and others who are based on elected institutions. And based on these regional issues, based on these external issues, those domestic institutions will be empowered or will be undermined. So I'll give you one example. Right now, look at the situation in Syria. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is heavily involved in Syria – they're backing Bashar Al-Assad. More than a year ago, when Bashar Al-Assad was on the verge of collapse and a lot of people thought the U.S. was about to bomb Syria, all of a sudden there was a shift in the balance of power inside Iran. And the pragmatists, led by the president, were arguing that maybe Iran should not stick to Assad to the end, that maybe Iran should compromise. All of a sudden, when Bashar Al-Assad agreed to dismantle his chemical arsenal and Iran sent a lot of advisors to Syria to keep Assad in power, the balance of power shifted in Syria – so it did in Iran. And you cannot overestimate how much Assad's survival impacted the confidence of the conservatives in Iran. And so if the Revolutionary Guards had a major success in Syria to keep Assad in charge, automatically they became much more powerful inside the country as well. So, always those institutions that are involved outside, they achieve domestic gains.
On Washington’s Approach To Dealing With Iran
So there are two different groups in Washington right now: one group that considers the Iranian Government as a monolith, as you said, and they pretty much say it is a very conservative, fanatic regime, and the U.S. should pursue hawkish policies and undermine them and eventually change this regime; there's a second group, however, that does believe that there is a very dynamic, factional politics inside Iran. There are moderates, and there are conservatives. And in this vicious domestic rivalry, there is so much the U.S. can do to capitalize on, or to exploit, and to try to empower the moderates. I think the policy implication of my argument is this: the second group is right. However, the best way to exploit Iran's domestic politics, the best way to empower the moderates, is not to do anything. Is not to exploit it. Is to treat Iran as a monolith. Because the moment you decide to empower the moderates in Iran, you make the other side nervous.
FULL TRANSCRIPT
SUZETTE GRILLOT, HOST: Mohammad Tabaar, welcome to World Views.
MOHAMMAD TABBAR: Thank you for having me.
GRILLOT: One of the things I want to start with is your work that you've done on the international sources of Iran's domestic politics. And the reason why is that we often tend to think of countries really focusing first on the domestic sources, in terms of the domestic pressures. So whether it's interest groups or certain public opinions or whatever it may be internal to the country, that is having an impact on their position and the decisions that they're making. Whether it's to obtain a nuclear weapons program, or whatever it is. And in this case you're arguing that there are external sources, international sources that are influencing what's going on in Iran. So first of all, can you tell us what those sources are? What do you mean by that? And then what are the domestic consequences of those external or international sources?
TABAAR: Sure. In my research on Iran since the ’79 Revolution, I noticed that various political actors and factions and institutions in Iran often manipulate external issues for domestic gain. And it goes back, as I said, all the way to the ’78, ’79 Islamic Revolution. And I'll give you one example. We often hear the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran, which ended Iran-U.S. relations, we often hear that that happened because of the 1953 coup. So it was a reaction that the Iranian Islamist students had towards that 53 coup, as I said, the CIA-led coup in Iran. But the truth is that the Islamists at the time were afraid of the nationalist and the leftist groups. And in order to marginalize these, both of their rivals, what they did was they decided to do the ultimate act – and that was to occupy the U.S. Embassy to capitalize on massive anti-American sentiment in Iran. Example number two: the Iran-Iraq War. There's no question that Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. However, the clerical establishment in Iran at the time implicitly welcomed the war because they hadn't consolidated themselves yet. Partly through the hostage crisis they could consolidate certain aspects of the regime, but not completely. So they used the Iran-Iraq War to make sure that the Iranian Army, and also the remnants of the nationalist and leftist groups, were subdued or completely eradicated so that they could not pose a threat. Fast-forward to today. If in the 70s and 80s, anti-Americanism was the capital, was the major issue to use to gain domestic legitimacy, now it's pro-Americanism. What's interesting in Iran is Iran is probably the – or maybe one of – the most pro-American nations in the Muslim World. "Why?" is a different question. But what we see now, various political groups in Iran, including the president right now, would like to capitalize on this to improve relations with the U.S. for domestic gain.
GRILLOT: So when you talk about "domestic gain", I think I have two related questions here. One is, we often think about domestic political maneuverings to be in reaction to or a diversion from something that's going on inside the country. So what you're describing here -- reacting to, or manipulating, as you say, externals actors and external events and external sources in order to enhance some sort of domestic political gain, as you're referring to it -- is that an attempt to divert attention from something that's going on inside the country? Or is it just some way to consolidate power and to overcome rivalries and to engage in some sort of competition where somebody wins and somebody loses? Or is it maybe a little bit of both?
TABAAR: It is probably a little bit of both. But it's mostly, I would say, the second. So there is a competition right now between two political factions in the country. One is led by the Supreme Leader and the IRGC and other appointed institutions. And the second one is the president and others who are based on elected institutions. And based on these regional issues, based on these external issues, those domestic institutions will be empowered or will be undermined. So I'll give you one example. Right now, look at the situation in Syria. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is heavily involved in Syria – they're backing Bashar Al-Assad. More than a year ago, when Bashar Al-Assad was on the verge of collapse and a lot of people thought the U.S. was about to bomb Syria, all of a sudden there was a shift in the balance of power inside Iran. And the pragmatists, led by the president, were arguing that maybe Iran should not stick to Assad to the end, that maybe Iran should compromise. All of a sudden, when Bashar Al-Assad agreed to dismantle his chemical arsenal and Iran sent a lot of advisors to Syria to keep Assad in power, the balance of power shifted in Syria – so it did in Iran. And you cannot overestimate how much Assad's survival impacted the confidence of the conservatives in Iran. And so if the Revolutionary Guards had a major success in Syria to keep Assad in charge, automatically they became much more powerful inside the country as well. So, always those institutions that are involved outside, they achieve domestic gains. I'll give you a second example: when Iran managed to strike a deal with the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany – and that was last November – all of a sudden, Rouhani and his foreign minister Zarif and others, they became a lot more popular. And precisely because of that, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC became worried and they decided to slow down the nuclear negotiations process – which, again, we don't know whether or not it's going to succeed in the next couple of months – precisely because of the domestic consequence that the nuclear deal could have.
GRILLOT: So I have to ask this: In your experience, when you are making these arguments and, I presume, working with academics, but also policymakers, and presenting your findings and research regarding Iran's domestic political maneuvering – do you think that this often comes as a surprise to many decision-makers over here? Because I have to think that we often tend to think of Iran – and other countries, too, but in this case Iran – as a unitary actor. That there's this supreme Islamic state, and that there is no domestic political separation of power and competition, but that they are unified on these issues like Syria or like the nuclear question. So does this come as a surprise? Is that an obstacle to overcome to just help us understand those domestic political divisions in Iran? And how we might be able to, for lack of a better term, exploit that to create a more favorable regime in Iran?
TABAAR: That's a really good and important question. So there are two different groups in Washington right now: one group that considers the Iranian Government as a monolith, as you said, and they pretty much say it is a very conservative, fanatic regime, and the U.S. should pursue hawkish policies and undermine them and eventually change this regime; there's a second group, however, that does believe that there is a very dynamic, factional politics inside Iran. There are moderates, and there are conservatives. And in this vicious domestic rivalry, there is so much the U.S. can do to capitalize on, or to exploit, and to try to empower the moderates. I think the policy implication of my argument is this: the second group is right. However, the best way to exploit Iran's domestic politics, the best way to empower the moderates, is not to do anything. Is not to exploit it. Is to treat Iran as a monolith. Because the moment you decide to empower the moderates in Iran, you make the other side nervous. And what the conservatives will do is, automatically and quickly, they try to derail any rapprochement or any negotiations or anything that would benefit the moderates. So the best way to support the moderates is not to support them.
GRILLOT: This seems really counterintuitive, though, doesn't it?
TABAAR: Absolutely.
GRILLOT: And don't policymakers push back a little bit on that in terms of how to react?
TABAAR: Absolutely. They do, you're right. But the problem is, we have seen this time and again. And by the way, this goes back to the ‘79 Revolution. There have been various groups in Washington who have appreciated the nuances of Iranian politics; however, their appreciation has been, as you said, counterintuitive – and counterproductive because it has backfired. Every time the U.S., the Americans, or the Western governments say, "so and so is a moderate president or a moderate group we should work with," this is the kiss of death and it undermines them. However, the problem is, as you suggested, it is very difficult to make this issue institutionalized in Washington. There are people who either hate the government because it's a monolith and it is conservative, and there are others who would like to support the moderates, however, they don't, unfortunately, in practice.
GRILLOT: Well this makes for a very challenging foreign policy, right? In terms of how best to approach Iran. So let's go there and end on the subject of the U.S.-Iranian relationship and what we can expect in the future. I mean, there seem to be some signs of movement in terms of engagement, let's say, among at least lower-level decision-makers and officials. So what can we expect in the future? Do you expect that some of these domestic political changes might emerge where moderates might come out ahead of the extremists? Or not? And then how do you think this might affect, ultimately, the U.S.-Iranian relationship?
TABAAR: So after eight years of President Ahmadinejad and all the consequences, all the domestic and regional consequences that his presidency had, there was a massive urge – not just on the part of the population, but even on the part of a lot of elites within the regime – that maybe there should be a more moderate president. The fruit of this was, the silver lining of eight years of former President Ahmadinejad, was that all of a sudden in June 2013, the election was relatively free and fair by Iran's standard, and then we had a more pragmatic candidate who was able to win. And that was president Hassan Rouhani. President Rouhani ran on the platform of resolving Iran's nuclear issue. And within the first 100 days after he assumed office, he struck a deal with the P5+1, basically suspended certain aspects of Iran's nuclear program and in return no additional sanctions were imposed on Iran and, in fact, some sanctions were removed. His goal is to change this into better relations with world. And again, right after the nuclear deal last November, Iran improved it's relations with the UK, and they were hoping to upgrade that into better relations with the U.S. And one of the things that happened after President Rouhani became president was he, for the first time ever, spoke with an American president, with President Obama. And Iran's Foreign Minister has been meeting with the Secretary of State John Kerry several times. So the taboo of Iran-U.S. lack of negotiations between the two countries has been broken. And that has made President Rouhani very popular. And what he's hoping to do is, there is going to be a very important – actually two important elections in Iran in 2016. One is the Assembly of Experts, which chooses the next Supreme Leader. The other one is the Majlis, the Parliament in Iran. These are two very critical bodies, especially the second one. And he would like to use this nuclear issue to win elections next time and bring more pragmatists into these important critical bodies, and eventually undermine the conservatives. Whether or not he's going to succeed, it remains to be seen.
GRILLOT: But it sounds like there's some hope?
TABAAR: Absolutely. There is some hope. However, on the other hand, the other side is aware of this tactic and they are doing everything they could to undermine this process.
GRILLOT: Well, Mohammad, thank you so much for being here with us today to discuss that U.S.-Iran relationship. So thank you.
TABAAR: Thank you. My pleasure.
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