Iran flirted with democracy during the early part of the 20th century, but it didn’t quite stick.
That two-year experiment influenced Democratic movements across the globe in the years before and during World War I. Boston University historian Houchang Chehabi is the author of the 2010 book Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations, and Transnational Connections. He says Japan, China, the Ottomoan Empire, Ireland, and Morocco all took cues from the 1906-1907 Iranian Constitutional Revolution.
“The texts that the constitutionalists in Morocco looked at was actually the constitution of Iran, which itself was influenced by other cases, Chehabi told KGOU’s World Views. “The 1907 constitution in Iran was based on the Belgian constitution of 1831, with elements from the Bulgarian constitution. So there are really connections between many countries of the world in Asia and Europe and Africa where the same ideas circulate.”
The Pahlavi monarchy grew more powerful through the 20th century, and was eventually overthrown by followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Chehabi says Iranians who support champion popular sovereignty and reject theocracy still champion those ideals from the 1906-1907 revolution.
“There are many people in Iran – the so-called reformists – who want to strengthen the republican element in Iran and weaken the clerical element, because Iran currently is not a pure theocracy. Elections matter,” Chehabi said. “The daily lives of people are affected by who wins an election, which means that these elections actually have a political significance.”
Chehabi says after unsuccessful 2009 Green Revolution, many reformers grew more cautious. Because a vast majority of Iranian citizens don’t want another revolution, bottom-up change is far less likely than top-down change.
“That would automatically mean a loss of influence for those whose power is not based on elections,” Chehabi said. “Those circles within the Iranian political system are also the ones who control the courts, the police, the army, the Revolutionary Guards – in other words, the oppressive apparatus of the state – and therefore they are not going to go away without a fight. And the other side is trying everything to avoid a fight.”
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FULL TRANSCRIPT
SUZETTE GRILLOT, HOST: Houchang Chehabi, welcome to World Views.
HOUCHANG CHEHABI: Thank you very much.
GRILLOT: Well I'd like to begin with your work from a few years ago about the liberation movement in Iran. As a specialist on Iran, as an Iranian yourself, born and raised in Iran, tell us about that liberation movement that really began several years ago, and how it's developed over the years.
CHEHABI: The Liberation Movement was a political party. It was a political party formed in 1961 in the liberalization that came about as a result of President John F. Kennedy's initiatives. And the founders of this political party were of the belief that Islam is fully compatible with democracy. So you could call them, if you like, "liberal Islamists." They believed in free elections and a free press, et cetera. But the life of the party was very short because in 1963 the opening ended, and the leadership went into jail. They reemerged at the Iranian Revolution in 1978-9. Most of the leadership of the party was involved in the provisional government that tried to govern Iran between February '79 and November 1979. But when the American hostages were seized, that government resigned, obviously, because they couldn't ensure the safety of diplomats, which is what a government needs to do. And since then they have been in the opposition to the Islamic Republic.
GRILLOT: So they still exist, and they obviously left some legacy. There have been some reforms, some changes that they were responsible for. The constitution, other aspects of Iranian politics and society?
CHEHABI: Not really. The old constitution was in 1906, way before the party was formed in 1961. And the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which dates from 1979, is very much in opposition to everything the party stands for, because the party stands for popular sovereignty. And the constitution of the Islamic Republic is one which is theocratic. Which is one reason that they have not been allowed to be active politically.
GRILLOT: So the constitution as it exists in Iran right now bears no resemblance to any kind of previous liberation movement or...
CHEHABI: No.
GRILLOT: ...any aspect at all. Purely theocratic.
CHEHABI: Yeah.
GRILLOT: So you've written a book or edited a book on Iran's constitutional revolution, the subtitle of which is "Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations, and Transnational Connections." What are you suggesting in that work regarding the constitutional revolution? What are we referring to?
CHEHABI: The constitutional revolution in Iran ended the absolute monarchy that had existed in Iran for thousands of years, and gave Iran a liberal constitution with a prime minister, elections, a parliament. The shah became a figurehead. And this was brought about by a popular movement. This was the very first popular movement of the 20th century that brought about a constitution. So in other words, many layers of society, many strata in society united to try to put an end to arbitrary government. The idea was that even those who ruled must obey the law. This revolution was then followed by others. In 1911 we had the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolutionaries, some of them were actually inspired by the Iranian revolution. They followed the events very closely. So what we try to do in this book is go beyond a blow-by-blow narrative of what happened and look at the social bases of who the revolutionaries were, what they tried to achieve, and most importantly, how they related to constitutionalists elsewhere in the world. In Japan, in China, in the Ottoman Empire, in Ireland, et cetera.
GRILLOT: And we're talking about the 20th century revolutions...
CHEHABI: 1906-1907.
GRILLOT: ...1906-1907, that had an impact on revolutions elsewhere, but also constitutional development elsewhere.
CHEHABI: Yes, yes, there were even, in Morocco two years later, there was an attempt to install a revolution. And the text that the constitutionalists in Morocco looked at was actually the constitution of Iran. Which itself was influenced by other cases. For instance, the 1907 constitution in Iran was based on the Belgian constitution of 1831, with elements from the Bulgarian constitution. So there are really connections between many countries of the world in Asia and Europe and Africa where the same ideas circulate.
GRILLOT: Are there movements or groups in Iran today that refer back to this period in Iranian history?
CHEHABI: Absolutely. All those who reject theocracy. All those who reject clerical rule, and who champion popular sovereignty. One of their references is obviously the constitution of 1906-1907. For instance, the liberation movement of Iran that I just mentioned, they would probably be much happier in an Iran governed by the 1906-1907 constitution than by the 1979 constitution.
GRILLOT: So what kind of hope do we have for popular movements in Iran today to perhaps bring about this kind of reform and change? I want to get to Iranian relations in the region, and particularly with the United States, but just sticking with Iranian domestic politics now, how likely is it that we can see that sort of movement emerging in Iran? Because things are changing, and clearly their relationships are changing, which we're going to get to. So what do you think the hope is for that?
CHEHABI: Every now and then movement in that direction occurs. For instance, the Green Movement of 2009 was very much a movement in that direction. There are many people in Iran - the so-called reformists - who want to strengthen the republican element in Iran and weaken the clerical element. Because Iran currently is not a pure theocracy. Elections matter. The daily lives of people are affected by who wins an election, which means that these elections actually have a political significance. Except that there are also lots of unelected officials who can stymie the activities of elected officials. So what the reform movement in Iran tries to do is to strengthen the Republican elements of the constitution, thereby weakening the non-Democratic elements of the revolution. The Green Movement in 2009 tried to do that and was repressed. So at this point people have become much more cautious, and Iranian citizens, most of them, the vast majority of Iranians don't want another revolution. The revolution was very painful for everybody. So they don't want another revolution. They are pragmatists. They want to work within the current framework to rebalance the various elements of the political system.
GRILLOT: So, for lack of a better way of putting it, maybe, bottom-up change in Iran is less likely than top-down change. That the government itself or those that are supportive of the theocracy and involved in the theocracy are going to see that it's important for Iran to change in order to enhance its relations with others in the region as well as its domestic standing.
CHEHABI: For instance, but for the time being it's unlikely to happen, because that would automatically mean a loss of influence for those whose power is not based on elections. And those circles within the Iranian political system are also the ones who control the courts, the police, the army, the Revolutionary Guards - in other words, the oppressive apparatus of the state - and therefore they are not going to go away without a fight. And the other side is trying everything to avoid a fight.
GRILLOT: Well, so, from domestic challenges to international ones then, or regional challenges, you've also written about some of the challenges that Iran faces in the 21st century. You've written about Iran's close relationship with Lebanon that goes back many centuries. But it also has strained relations with others in the region. It's a difficult neighborhood, obviously, as we all know. So tell us a little bit about Iran's relations with its neighbors within its region. It's obviously a regional player and power. And then perhaps we can get to Iran's relationship with the United States, in Europe, and others around the world as it tries to manage both, as any other big state, important state, its regional relationships and its global relationships.
CHEHABI: Yeah, Iran's relationship with its neighbors fluctuates over time. For instance, before the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which began in 2005, the government really tried to do everything it could to improve relations with its neighbors. Even, for instance, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia visited Tehran. Iranian presidents went to Saudi Arabia, and so on. But in the last 10 years or so, relations have really deteriorated quite a bit, which has to do obviously also with sectarian tensions in the various countries. And right now, the interesting thing is that Iran is just about the most stable country in the Middle East. Compare Iran with Iraq, with Syria, with Afghanistan - how many refugees leave Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan. In Turkey, the civil war between the government and the Kurds just started again a few months ago. So this is precisely one of the reasons that people in Iran, those citizens who are unhappy with this political system, don't upheaval because they look at their neighbors and say, 'No, at least we are at peace. So let's not rock the boat too much.' But the growth of sectarianism in the Middle East, to which the Islamic Republic has contributed, let's not forget that, by supporting Shi'ite groups. By funding Shi'ite militias in Lebanon, for instance, like Hezbollah and so on, has obviously meant that the region is much less peaceful than it used to be.
GRILLOT: Can you comment on its relations with Saudi Arabia? The other major player in the Middle East? Obviously a Sunni country versus a Shi'ite country. How difficult is that relationship, and how do those two struggle to be the regional hegemon?
CHEHABI: Right. Well, both of these states are governed by people who believe that their interpretation of Islam is the best and should be spread around the world. So when the Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979, soon afterwards the Saudis - and I'm not necessarily talking about the Saudi government. This also includes the wealthy individuals or associations, started funding radical Sunni groups in order to rein in the impact of the Iranian Revolution. So, for instance, in Pakistan, Sunnis and Shi'is had lived at peace ever since the founding of the country. But by the early 1980s, sectarianism grows in Pakistan. Relations deteriorate because the Iranians were funding the Shi'ites of Pakistan. And the Saudis were funding radical Sunni groups who are opposed to Shi'is. So in other words, those countries of the Middle East where you have both Shi'is and Sunnis have become arenas for the power play between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
GRILLOT: Well, so finally then, we have to mention the relationship between Iran and the United States, which has been undergoing a considerable amount of change over the past year or so. The nuclear agreement that emerged. The United States and its European partners, in collaboration with Iran. How hopeful are you, optimistic are you about improved relations between the United States and Iran continuing on that path and really resulting in a much better environment between the two?
CHEHABI: The idea of going beyond the nuclear agreement to achieve a general improvement in Iran's ties with the west and the United States, that idea is opposed by many people in Iran. By all these hard-liners that I mentioned. By many elements in the Revolutionary Guard. And let's not forget that those people are the ultimate power. The Revolutionary Guards can, if they want to, make life very difficult for the foreign ministry, the president, et cetera. And there is now talk that the supreme leader of the country, who sides with the hard-liners, really wants to make sure that President Rouhani remains a one-term president. Which is precisely because, a few weeks ago, in his New Year's speech, President Rouhani eluded to the fact that the nuclear agreement could be followed up by an improvement in other fields as well. Economic and so. And immediately the supreme leader came down against this idea.
GRILLOT: Dr. Chehabi, thank you so much for being with us today on World Views to talk about Iran.
CHEHABI: Thank you for having me.
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